INTRODUCTION
The privilege against self-incrimination contained in the fifth amendment of the inited States Constitution' has proven to be a difficult provision of the Bill of Rights to interpret. 2 The language used by the framers establishing the privilege is both ambiguous 3 and misleading, 4 thereby making textual analysis unconvincing. Similarly, the historical background and intent of the framers are unclear, 5 features which otherwise would assist in defining the proper scope of the privilege. Finally, the policies that the fifth amendment is designed to further 6 are seriously disputed, leaving the privilege without an agreed upon rationale.
1 The relevant language provides that "no person ...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness ag inst himself." U.S. CONsr. amend. V. (1977) . The "witness" requirement is of a similar character. While it suggests that compulsion upon the accused to assist the state at trial is barred, the Court has instead held that the term only applies to the act of being a witness in a testimonial or communicative sense. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) . 4 The "no person" language of the privilege against self-incrimination gives no indication that persons acting in a representative capacity in holding documents are barred from asserting the fifth amendment when served with a subpoena. The Court, however, has imposed such a qualification. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) . ' The historical development of the right to remain silent in British common law tradition and American colonial experience covers many centuries and is simply too vast to comprehensively assess. Nevertheless, substantial historical treatment of the privilege can be found in (1935). ' The dispute over the policies behind the right to silence has been intense. McNaughton saw the privilege One particularly troublesome problem which the Supreme Court has had to face in interpreting the privilege has been the need to set limits on the kind and intensity of pressure the state may bring to bear upon an individual to reveal what the state wishes to know. At one extreme, pressure in the form of physical coercion might be exerted by the state to obtain damaging information from a suspect. The Supreme Court, however, has had little difficulty classifying physical force as impermissible compulsion.
7 Similarly, the threat of the criminal contempt sanction has been held to violate the privilege against self-incrimination.
8 Even many
as: 1) protecting the innocent defendant from a bad performance on the stand; 2) avoiding burdening the courts with false testimony; 3) encouraging witness testimony by precluding their compulsory incrimination; 4) a recognition of the practical limits of governmental power; 5) preventing the use of procedures employed by such discredited institutions as the Star Chamber; 6) justified by history; 7) serving to avoid distasteful situations; 8) spurring the prosecutor to perform a complete investigation; .9) frustrating "bad laws" which infringe on political and religious beliefs; 10) deterring "fishing expedition" prosecutions; I1) preventing torture and inhumane treatment; and 12) contributing to a fair individual-state balance in criminal justice. J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2251 at 310-18. Jeremy Bentham, in contrast, far less coercive tactics have been deemed unconstitutional compulsion, particularly when employed by law enforcement officers.
9
Despite the Court's unmistakable rejection of overt coercion to obtain admissions from a suspect,' 0 and its special concern for the quality of the police interrogation process," the Court has never intimated that information obtained as a result of any pressure, however slight, is barred by the privilege against self-incrimination. To the contrary, only pressure that amounts to compulsion is prohibited by the fifth amendment language. But, when the state seeks information and offers the individual being questioned the choice of providing it or facing a consequence, it is difficult to determine whether constitutional bounds have been exceeded. 12 Torture, the threat of being jailed, and pressed in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm. of N.Y., where it stated that one of the foundations of the privilege is "our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or con- o See notes 7-8 supra.
1 The absence of legal compulsion in the police interrogation process would arguably justify exclusive use of the due process clause to control police questioning. See J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2252, at 328-29. The Court's Miranda decision not only rejected that restrictive view of the privilege, but also demonstrated a special concern in the affirmative warning requirements that it has refused to apply elsewhere. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (grand jury). The special concern for police interrogation is a result of the secrecy of the process, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 448-50; opportunities for its abuse, Judging how heavily the state may burden the decision to exercise or forego the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is a concededly problematic undertaking. 4 Nevertheless, the formulation of a standard is essential to insure principled decisionmaking. Unfortunately, however, the Supreme Court has thus far avoided the task. The decisions from the Warren era suggest in very broad language that any burden on the exercise of the right to remain silent is forbidden,' 5 while more recent rulings have barred only those penalties automatically imposed for assertions of the privilege.' 6 Neither extreme, however, represents a satisfactory resolution of the conflicting interests involved. Rather, as argued below, the fifth amendment should stand as a presumptive barrier against the imposition of sanctions on those who claim their right to silence, allowing adverse consequences only when the state is pursuing a substantial state interest which it cannot achieve in alternative ways.
THE LIMITS OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-

INCRIMINATION
Although the Court has avoided the establishment of standards to assess state imposed burdens on the fifth amendment, it has elsewhere defined precise limits to the scope of the privilege against 13 In a sense, choice is always present since the individual can always remain silent and accept the dire consequence. However, it is apparent that the Court has not assessed the ability to choose from the perspective of heroes and martyrs.
" See Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brieffor More Careful Analysis, 55 Tax. L. REV. 193, 246-51 (1977) 308 (1976) (adverse inference from invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination at a prison disciplinary hearing held constitutional).
(Vol. 70 self-incrimination. In turn, the fifth amendment only regulates burdens affecting interests that the privilege protects; claims falling outside the specific range of the self-incrimination clause must find protection elsewhere.'
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The Court has, for example, interpreted the language of the privilege to exclude its application to organizations. t s The fifth amendment provides that "no person" shall be compelled to incriminate himself, and the Court has chosen a literal construction of that phrase. Not only can organizations not assert the privilege, but their agents in possession of materials sought are similarly barred despite potential personal incrimination.' 9 Most recently, in denying self-incrimination protection to a threeman law firm, the Court indicated that the governing standard is the capacity in which the papers sought are held rather than the character of the organization holding them. 2° The Court's treatment of assertions of privilege by organizations and their representatives provides an indication of the limiting effect that the "no person" qualification has on the fifth amendment. Organizations are not the only entities holding papers in a representative capacity, and when private material is turned over to another by its owner the self-incrimination protection need not necessarily follow the documents. Such is the current view of the Supreme Court: 21 17 The Court, for example, has utilized the due process clause rather than the fifth amendment to invalidate the use of pretrial silence, following a Miranda warning, for impeachment use at trial. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) . Similarly, the absence of fifth amendment warning requirements in the grand jury, United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976) the 'person' who cannot be compelled to incriminate himself is the accused; those who hold documents for him, but who would not be incriminated by them, cannot assert the privilege.
Rather than protecting the privacy of documents,s" the Court has construed the privilege against self-incrimination to prevent obtaining documents in a prohibited manner from one who petitioner's accountant directing the production of all documents relating to the tax liability of the client. Couch sought to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination to bar production of the documents by her accountant, but was unsuccessful. The Court, however, viewed the privilege as "an intimate and personal one," 409 U.S. at 327, and noted that "possession bears the closest relationship to the personal compulsion forbidden by the Fifth Amendment." I, at 331. The Court specifically rejected ownershij of documents as the relevant standard for the privilege, but did recognize that "situations may well arise where constructive possession is so clear or the relinquishment of possession is so temporary and insignificant as to leave the personal compulsion upon the accused substantially intact." Id. at 333.
In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), the taxpayer, unlike the petitioner in Couch, had retrieved his tax records from his accountant. But, in order to obtain legal, advice, the documents were turned over to the taxpayer's attorney who asserted the self-incrimination clause in an effort to resist their production in response to an IRS subpoena. The Supreme Court, in language much stronger than that used in Couch, rejected this fifth amendment argument. The Court succinctly concluded that there was no violation of the fifth amendment in the production order because its "enforcement against a taxpayer's lawyer would not 'compel' the taxpayer to do anything-and certainly would not compel him to be a 'witness' against himself." Id. at 397. Neither the fact that the taxpayer in Fisher had reasserted control over the documents nor the differing expectations of privacy and confidence one might have in turning documents over to an attorney rather than an accountant (due to the evidentiary privilege applicable to the former) was deemed sufficient to alter the result. Although Fisher, like Couch, included the possibility that fifth amendment protection might be available in situations of constructive possession or temporary relinquishment, Id at 398, no indication was given as to what set of facts the Court would deem sufficient. To the contrary, the Court's decisions seem more in tune with a rule that "a party incriminated by evidence produced by a third party sustains no violation of his own Fifth Amendment rights." California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55 (1974 1976) , the Court permitted enforcement of a subpoena for the production of records held by the taxpayer's attorney and indicated that the records could also have been subpoenaed from the taxpayer himself. The Court felt that such an order directed to the taxpayer "does not compel oral testimony; nor would it ordinarily compel the taxpayer to restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of the contents of the documents sought." Id. at 409. The Court did concede that response to a documentary subpoena admits possession of the documents and may provide implicit authentication. Whether this provides the necessary incriminatory potential, however, must be judged on a case by case basis. Id. at 410-11. See also J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2264, at 380. But, under the Court's theory, it would appear that only writings whose possession is intrinsically incriminating are likely to receive any fifth amendment protection, and this is certain to constitute a narrow sphere. Whether the first or fourth amendments will add anything to the Court's resolution was left undecided. 425 U.S. at 401 n.7.
25 The Court has held that a grant of testimonial immunity provides sufficient protection to allow the state to compel the production of the information it seeks. or communicative in character.26 The Court has stated that the privilege "offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture., 27 Not only is the fifth amendment not a barrier to all forms of coerced assistance to the state, but it also makes no distinction between passive or affirmative aid.
2 s The only expansively interpreted provision of the privilege against self-incrimination has been the clause limiting its application to "any criminal case." Literally read, the language suggests that compulsory self-incrimination is forbidden only at the criminal trial stage of legal proceedings. Such a construction, however, would virtually eliminate the privilege against self-incrimination as a meaningful guarantee. Allowing the state to compel admissions at one proceeding for later use in a criminal trial would make the right to silence at trial an empty formality. The Court has, therefore, accepted the necessity of permitting assertion of the privilege in any setting in which self-incrimination may occur, 2 ' including the grand jury a a congressional hearing, 3 ' or a civil proceeding.32
It has also been deemed necessary to extend selfincrimination protection beyond directly incriminating evidence to include information forming a link in the chain to such evidence.33 And, "it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result for an assertion of privilege to be valid." 5 ' But, failure to claim the privilege or the provision of partial information may be deemed a waiver of fifth amendment rights.s Much of the doctrine that now governs fifth amendment decisions appears to be a reflection of the historical origins of the privilege against selfincriminationse The state is thus barred from torture and placing suspects in the "cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt," ' ' but little more. The Court has also refused to utilize the privilege to protect broader privacy interests,as and the narrowed scope of the Court's fifth amendment decisions is the result. Yet, given all the qualifications which the Court has imposed upon the privilege against self-incrimination, one might anticipate a clear and consistent policy of protection for fifth amendment interests when they are validly claimed. But, as the case law and supporting analysis indicate, such is not the case. Not only has the scope of the privilege been narrowed, but the state has been permitted to coerce individuals into forgoing its exercise, and no persuasive rationale explains the Court's policy.
REGULATING FIFrH AMENDMENT BURDENS
A. The Absolutist Position
The compulsion requirement of the privilege against self-incrimination and its interpretation by ' Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951) -5 Provision of partial information may be deemed a waiver because of the Court's concern for "distortion of facts by permitting a witness to select any stopping place in the testimony." Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951). As a result, "where criminating facts have been voluntarily revealed, the privilege cannot be invoked to avoid disclosure of the details." Id. at 373. The Court's waiver analysis has, however, been subject to criticism. See generally Dix, supra note 14.
Elsewhere, as to witnesses, the Court has held that testimony in response to official questioning is not compelled self-incrimination. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970). Similarly, responses on a tax return are not compelled self-incrimination. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976). In such cases, the privilege must be invoked to be applicable, although the Court has been less willing to rely on a waiver theory for this analysis. Id at 654 n.9.
' See Ritchie, supra note 3, at 385-86. 3 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) .
a The Court has stated that: "The Framers addressed the subject of personal privacy directly in the Fourth Amendment.... They did not seek in still another Amendment-the Fifth-to achieve a general protection of privacy but to deal with the more specific issue of compelled self-incrimination." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400 (1976).
the Court, provides some support for the view that the fifth amendment is an absolute barrier to state imposed burdens on the right to remain silent. Simply stated, any state action which "compels" self-incrimination violates the privilege. The meaningfulness of this approach, however, is tied to the Court's conception of compulsion. Moreover, the Court may feel constrained to read the requirement narrowly in light of the fact that state actions so classified would be totally barred.
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In selected instances the Court has used absolutist language to reject a burden imposed by the state on the privilege against self-incrimination. Such was the case in Griffin v. California, 4° where the Court held that the fifth amendment bars comment upon a defendant's failure to testify. The Court characterized comments upon a defendant's trial silence and judicial acquiescence in those comments as "a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege" and objected to the fact that it "cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly."' similarly reflects a broad view of'judicial power to reject unconstitutional compulsion.Jackson held the capital punishment provision of the federal kidnapping statute unenforceable because only the jury could impose it, a sentencing structure which served to deter assertion of the right to plead not guilty and be tried by ajury. The Court noted that "Congress cannot impose such a penalty in a manner that needlessly penalizes the assertion of a constitutional right."' 3 Like Griffin, the death pen-3 In Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), the Court held that the fifth amendment was not offended by a procedure in which prison disciplinary defendants facing potential criminal charges suffered an adverse inference in the prison proceeding if they exercised the privilege against self-incrimination. In contrast, the dissent put forward a persuasive argument that the compulsion was "obvious." Id. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court's narrow reading of compulsion may well be partly out of a concern that the traditional use of adverse inferences outside of the criminal trial not be undercut, a result that might arguably have followed had the inference been barred in the prison context. alty provision of the statute constituted an intolerable burden upon the exercise of the fifth amendment." The language in Griffin andjackson suggests that the state may not penalize the assertion of fifth amendment rights, but does not explain why such penalties are barred. On the one hand, the penalties might be so severe as to cause all information obtained as a result of them to be considered compelled; such would be the case if the state presented an individual with the choice of revealing information or submitting to torture.45 But, there are few penalties which so uniformly result in the deprivation of free choice and the elimination of the ability to resist. Indeed, the Court's unwillingness to invalidate guilty pleas secured under the kidnapping statute prior to Jackson 46 and the numerous decisions refusing to overturn convictions despite improper prosecutorial comment, 4 7 may indicate that the Court does not believe that theJackson and Griffin penalties only produce "compelled" admissions. It is also possible to take the Court literally and read Griffin and Jackson as barring the imposition of any consequence whatsoever on the assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination. Included would be penalties which alone produce compulsion, as well as others, which may exert pressure in favor of disclosure, but can be resisted. In effect, such an approach would implicitly read the com-" Of similar character was the Court's decision in Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972) . There, the Court held the Tennessee rule requiring the defendant to testify before his other witnesses to be a violation of the fifth amendment. The Court felt the rule to be a contradiction of the defendant's right "to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty... for such silence." Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) . Brooks, Jackson and Griffin all reflect special concern for the defendant's right to remain silent at his criminal trial. See Berger, supra note 2, at 195-201.
"Torture would also constitute a due process violation. See e.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 237-38 (1940) . Mental coercion is also barred. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S. 199, 206 (1960) .
46Jackson did not hold all guilty pleas under the federal kidnapping statute to be compelled; rather, it categorized the structure as one in which guilty pleas were needlessly encouraged. 390 U.S. at 583. In light of this, the Court could subsequently uphold the constitutionality of pleas accepted under the statute. Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742 (1970) . 47 The courts either hold such comments to be harmless pulsion requirement of the fifth amendment as encompassing a broad array of state tactics since it is only compulsion to be a witness against oneself that the privilege forbids. Seemingly, under this view, any state actions that undercut an individual's pure and free choice to assert or forego the privilege would be barred, and compulsion would then control not only situations where the only real choice available was self-incrimination, but also those in which the alternatives were not equally advantageous." A position barring any consequence for the assertion of fifth amendment rights is attractively simple and seemingly offers unwavering protection for the right to remain silent. Both befiefits may, however, be more illusory than real. If the rule is unyielding, it may well sacrifice important state interests in its application, and to avoid such a result the courts would undoubtedly find that what appear to be penalties imposed on the right to silence are really something else.
49
Beyond the potential deceptiveness of the theory barring all state imposed consequences for assertion of the privilege, it must also be stated that neither history nor precedent support so expansive a reading of the fifth amendment. The British origins 9 f the privilege against self-incrimination are found in cases of physical torture and administration of the coercive oath ex officio,s° while the American case law has focused upon abusive interrogation techniques.
51 Both traditions are far removed from '8 The Court's statements in Griffin that the privilege bars making its assertion "costly," 380 U.S. at'614, and in Malloy that the decision to speak must be "unfettered" and without penalty, 378 U.S. at 8, represent the most supportive language for this view.
California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971) , perhaps best illustrates this problem. There, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the California "hit and run" statute, similar to those in force in all the states and the District of Columbia. It is certainly arguable, as reflected in Mr. Justice Harlan's concurrence, that a requirement that drivers identify themselves after an accident is too important a state interest to sacrifice. Instead, the plurality chose to treat the case as one in which the risk of selfincrimination was insubstantial. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), in which the Court refused to consider the use of an adverse inference from silence in a prison disciplinary hearing as an unconstitutional penalty, is similar in character.
50 See generally sources cited supra note 5. The history reflects primary concern for physical and legal compulsion. the variety of lesser consequences that the invocation of the privilege may entail, and it does not seem appropriate to place them all in the same category. Severe penalties may negate free choice, but minor sanctions necessarily do not. The compulsion language of the privilege bars the state from depriving its citizens of the ability to choose between self-incrimination or silence, thereby placing them between the "rock and the whirlpool." 5 2
Requiring individuals to make difficult decisions, but not impossible ones, is not so clearly barred.m It appears more likely that the burdens on the fifth amendment found in Griffin and Jackson were rejected for reasons unrelated to a concern for their inherently compulsive character or a desire to proclaim a ban on any consequence for assertion of the privilege. Exactly what characteristics of the tenalties made them exceed constitutional bounds, however, is left unclear." Instead, the Court used language suggestive of theories that even further analysis will not support. Perhaps the reason, as Mr. Justice Harlan observed, is that due "in part to the flagrant facts often before the Court" its cases disclose that the language in many of the opinions overstates the actual course of decision.ss Yet, this does not help us to assess what consequences the state may validly impose.
B. Barring Coerced Waivers
In another series of fifth amendment cases, the Supreme Court was faced with a variety of state penalties imposed upon individuals who refused to waive the protection of the privilege against selfincrimination. At issue were state statutes and policies requiring officials or agents in the public sector to respond to questions propounded in an investigation of their activities. In addition, waivers of the privilege were demanded. The uniform invalidation of these tactics, however, conceals how little real protection the Court is willing to afford to those who wish to exercise their right to silence. 'The common feature of Griffin, Jackson and Brooks, the focus upon the right to silence at trial, is not a sufficient explanation of the decisions in light of McGautha, where the burdening of the right by precluding one who exercised it from addressing the sentencer on the issue of punishment was upheld.
5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 509-10 (19 §6) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Garriy v. NewJersey was the first of the waiverpenalty decisions. This 1967 case involved a New Jersey probe into the alleged fixing of traffic tickets by local police officers. The officers were questioned about their involvement after being warned that their answers could be used against them in a criminal proceeding and that state law subjected them to removal from office for failure to respond in such an inquiry. The questions were answered and the answers were, in turn, used in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
The opinion of the Court characterized the statements obtained from the police as coerced and therefore inadmissible.
5 7 The reason was that the "choice given petitioners was either to forfeit their jobs or to incriminate themselves. The option to lose their means of livelihood or to pay the penalty of self-incrimination is the antithesis of free choice to speak out or to remain silent.
' ' 8 Similarly, the Court rejected the notion that the privilege had been waived in light of the duress laden choice facing the police officers.9 Obviously, the decision whether or not to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination is made more difficult when a consequence follows assertion of the right. Whether or not the consequence has as its purpose the encouragement of fifth amendment waivers, it cannot avoid having such an effect. This should not, in and of itself, result in "compelled" self-incrimination unless the mere fact that the choice of silence or self-incriminationmade more difficult by the consequence-is sufficient to constitute compulsion. In other words, a decision such as Garril suggests that only a freely made choice of self-incrimination is constitutional, and the fact that the accused must weigh an additional state imposed consequence in his decision means that his choice can no longer be a free one.
Whereas Garrity was concerned with the admissibility of statements obtained without a grant of immunity and upon threat of dismissal, it did not resolve the question of whether the state could impose the consequence of dismissal if the individual being questioned chose to remain silent. Even though Garri y established that such statements are unconstitutionally compelled, barring their use in a criminal prosecution solves the fifth amendment problem and would presumably then authorize the 385 U.S. 493 (1967). 57 1d. at 497-98. 58Id. at 497.
9 "Where the choice is 'between the rock and the whirlpool,' duress is inherent in deciding to 'waive' one or the other." Id at 498. imposition of the consequence. Garriy is thereby converted into an unofficial grant of immunity, rather than serving as a barrier to the imposition of sanctions for silence.
Spevack v. Klein, 6° decided the same day as Garity, presented the opportunity to review the imposition of a Garrity -type sanction. The petitioner in Spevack was disbarred for refusing to provide information to a judicial inquiry after claiming the privilege against self-incrimination. As a result of Garrity, however, such statements are inadmissible. But in rejecting the disbarment penalty, the Spevack Court hinted that ultimate suppression is not sufficient to satisfy the privilege.
6 ' Not only is the state, therefore, precluded from utilizing the results of impermissible sanctions, but even the sanction itself may not be imposed. By focusing upon the coerced character of the statements obtained in Garrity and the invalidity of pressure used to obtain such statements in Spevack, the Court cast some doubt upon the ability of the state to call upon its servants to account for their conduct. Only Mr. Justice Fortas in Spevack suggested that dismissal for failure to respond in an official inquiry was proper as long as there was no coerced waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination.62 And, by 1968, with Mr. Justice Fortas writing the majority opinions, 63 this became the accepted doctrine.
64
The Court also clarified in its 1968 decisions the role that immunity should play in judging the validity of coercive state sanctions imposed upon 60 385 U.S. 511 (1967) . 61 The petitioner in Spevack faced questioning with the belief that his answers would be used against him. First, when Spevack was questioned, Garriy had not yet been decided; second, Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961), had ruled the privilege unavailable in similar circumstances; third, a waiver of immunity was demanded. Under these conditions, where Spevack had good reason to believe he enjoyed no immunity, it would have been unfair to uphold the penalty on the theory that suppression of the evidence was available. Nevertheless, the Court made no mention of Garrity in its decision.
6 385 U.S. at 519 (Fortas, J., concurring in the judgment).
6 Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n. v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968) . 64 In Gardner, Mr. Justice Fortas wrote: If appellant, a policeman, had refused to answer questions specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of his official duties, without being required to waive his immunity with respect to the use of his answers or the fruits thereof in a criminal prosecution of himself, ... the privilege against self-incrimination would not have been a bar to his dismissal. 392 U.S. at 278. those who remain silent. It had been previously established in Garriy that statements resulting from coercive sanctions are inadmissible, thus effectively conferring testimonial immunity. But, the existence of immunity by operation of law, particularly where the individual being questioned is not informed of it or is led to believe there is no immunity, did not save the sanctions. 65 The position was reaffirmed in the Court's 1973 decision in Lejkowitz v. Turley.' The opinions seem to suggest that only a refusal to respond after a formal grant of immunity can justify imposing a sanction for such refusal.
The Court's waiver-penalty decisions give no real indication as to why the penalties were declared invalid. The only similarity had been the economic character of the penalties, including loss of government employment, disbarment, and a five-year ban from government contracts. 6 Yet, these economic sanctions are not necessarily equivalent in their impact, although the Court believed that a waiver obtained "under threat of loss of contracts would have been no less compelled than a direct request for the testimony without resort to the waiver device. A waiver secured under threat of substantial economic sanction cannot be termed voluntary.
' ' ss The Court, however, has not stopped its line of decisions with "substantial economic sanctions."
The 1977 ruling in Lefkowitz v. Cunningham 69 applied the waiver-penalty principle to a political party official called to testify before a grand jury about his conduct in office. For refusing to waive the privilege against self-incrimination, the official lost his party positions and was barred from regaining them or any other public office for five years. None of the positions from which the official was removed were salaried; therefore, a label of"substantial economic sanction" could not have been applied to the state policy. Instead, the Court found that removal from office was precluded because 6 The conditions present in Spevack, were not present in Gardner. Nevertheless, the Court held that "the mandate of the great privilege against self-incrimination does not tolerate the attempt, regardless of its ultimate effectiveness, to coerce a waiver of the immunity it confers on penalty of the loss of employment. It is difficult. to imagine that the grand jury witness in Cunningham was "compelled" to incriminate himself in the same sense as the police officers in Garrity. Indeed, the fact that Cunningham asserted his right to remain silent suggests that the compulsion was far less effective. And, if the compulsion is not "compelling," how is the fifth amendment violated?
Perhaps the answer to this question lies in another unifying thread in the Garrity line of decisions. In each instance, the state penalty was concededly dramatic and either imposed or threatened to impose a consequence solely as a result of the invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination. The simple refusal to provide information without a grant of immunity was the exclusive triggering device. The Court may well have perceived this to be an unfair imposition on the constitutional right to remain silent. Rather than reaching a judgment on the constitutionality of the sanction based exclusively on the degree of compulsion it engenders, the Court may also have been weighing the fairness of imposing the sanction automatically upon assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination. 7 2 The implications of such an approach include the possibility that sanctions which are not automatically imposed, even if severe, may well survive constitutional challenge. Such a result would undercut much of the fifth amendment protection the waiver-penalty principles appear to provide.
That the Court is willing to tolerate substantial burdens on the privilege against self-incrimination as long as they are not automatically triggered by its assertion is demonstrated by the ruling in Baxter v. Palmigiana. 73 There, the Court considered a challenge by Rhode Island prison inmates to the constitutionality of prison disciplinary procedures. Self-Incrimination, 55 N.C.L. REv. 254 (1977) . 539 (1974), were reaffirmed. The Court refused to conIncluded in the practices attacked were the rules applicable to prison disciplinary cases in which inmates also faced potential criminal prosecution. In such cases, inmates were warned of their right to remain silent, but also informed that the disciplinary board would draw an adverse inference from invocation of that right. The Court ofAppeals had held that the fifth amendment barred an adverse inference in such circumstances,' but the Supreme Court disagreed and reversed.
Initially, the Palmigiano Court found no difficulty in distinguishing Griffin v. Califomia 76 which had barred comment on the defendant's failure to testify in his criminal trial. Very simply, Griffin held that no evidentiary use of silence can be made in a criminal proceeding, and that is the limit of the decision.7
The Garrity line of cases presented more of a challenge and sparked a bitter dissent from Mr. Justice Brennan. The Palmigiano Court majority characterized the waiver-penalty decisions as situations "where refusal to submit to interrogation and to waive the Fifth Amendment privilege, standing alone and without regard to the other evidence, resulted in loss of employment or opportunity to contract with the State. 7 8 In Palmigiano, remaining silent did not automatically trigger prison discipline; rather, the adverse inference it generated "was given no more evidentiary value than was warranted by the facts surrounding his' case."79 Moreover, the Court suggested that the' sider the application of due process safeguards to the loss of rison privileges. 425 U.S. at 423-24.
F' The court below recognized that use of immunity would resolve the fifth amendment problem. Palmigiano v. Baxter, 510 F.2d 534 (Ist Cir. 1974) .
380 U.S. 609 (1965).
7 Mr. Justice Brennan read Griffin as part of a series of cases barring the imposition of penalties on the assertion of fifth amendment rights, not as a special rule prohibiting comment on a defendant's silence at trial. 425 U.S.
at 330-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting). There are hints elsewhere, however, that the Court is interpreting Griffin narrowly. In particular, the Court has held that the state may not use a defendant's pretrial silence after a Miranda warning for impeachment purposes. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U. S. 610 (1976) . But, its ruling was based on the due process clause, not the fifth amendment. The dissenting position, unchallenged by the majority, distinguished Grifin as a case involving thie "prosecution's use of the defendant's silence in its case-in-chief." Id at 628 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Doyle reflects no suggestion of Griffin as a general bar to fifth amendment penalties. 
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fatal flaw in the Garrity line of cases was that the individuals' "failure to respond to interrogation was treated as a final admission of guilt, ' ' " a factor which had been important in the due process analysis of many of the 1950's loyalty oath cases.
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Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent rejected the fairness theory of the majority in favor of a compulsion analysis. He maintained that "the premise of the Garrity-Le/kowitz line was not that compulsion resulted from the automatic nature of the sanction, but that a sanction was imposed that made costly the exercise of the privilege.
' ' 2 As a further qualification, however, the dissent added that the burden in Palmigiano was a sufficiently "substantial sanction, ' m to justify invoking the waiver-penalty theory.
Although Justice Brennan did not seek to define the limits of his view of the waiver-penalty theory, it is nevertheless clear that his analysis is more protective of self-incrimination interests than the majority's fairness rationale. The fairness theory, much like the compulsion approach, will preclude, allowing the assertion of the right to remain silent to be the sole basis for invoking a penalty;U but it will not stop the state from using the exercise of the privilege as a factor contributing to the imposition of a penalty. The majority may well have been restricting the concept of compulsion to the severe abuses which generated the privilege against self-incrimination,s and thereby rewriting the SSee notes 50-51, supra.
Garrity cases to fit its due process style analysis.
Compulsion, then, amounts to only that which truly forces self-incrimination and other sanctions which unfairly penalize the privilege by being exclusively the result of its exercise. If so, it is a theory which may permit very heavy pressure indeed on the decision to exercise or forego the right to remain silent.
C. Balancing the Privilege
There is a middle ground between an absolutist approach to evaluating burdens on the right to remain silent and a theory which does no more than bar the automatic imposition of certain sanctions upon invocation of the privilege. Reflected in several Supreme Court decisions,8 the alternative involves a balancing of state and individual interests in assessing the permissibility of penalizing the exercise of fifth amendment rights. Presumably, not every penalty would be subjected to a balancing process of this sort. In particular, those penalties truly coercive in the sense of compelling self-incrimination would run afoul of the fifth amendment regardless of thejustifying state interest. Resistable, but harsh penalties, however, would be measured by this standard.
Crampton v. Ohio8 presents the most extensive treatment by the Court of a balancing theory of the fifth amendment. There, the defendant Crampton was convicted of first degree murder in Ohio and sentenced to death. Both the guilt determination and sentencing assessment were performed in a single proceeding, a procedure which forces the defendant to risk self-incrimination in order to address the sentencer on the issue of punishment.
Unquestionably, the situation facing Crampton required "the making of difficult judgments," ' but the Court did not consider the pressure as amounting to unconstitutional compulsion. As indicated above, only inherently coercive consequences, perhaps only those that are virtually irresistable, fit within the traditional compulsion standard. This leaves lesser burdens to be measured by a prbcess [Vol. 70 of balancing which, for the Court, involved the question of "whether compelling the election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved." And, the Court utilized only a single. page in concluding that fifth amendment history and policy were not offended by the unitary trial practice in capital cases.9 0 The only precedent creating difficulty for the Court's theory was its decision in Simmons v. United States.
9
1 There, a criminal defendant had moved to suppress critical government evidence. At the suppression hearing, the defendant testified to his possessory interest in the items seized in order to establish standing, and these admissions were used against him at trial after his motion to suppress was denied. Finding it "intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another," 9 2 the Court held that testimony in a fourth amendment suppression hearing may not be used over objection to prove guilt at trial. Where the choice is between two constitutional rights, there is a "tension ' ' 3 created which precludes use of the testimony at trial, despite the fact that the testimony might be viewed as voluntary in the traditional sense.9 Application of the Simmons constitutional tension theory to the facts of Crampton poses something of . problem. On one side of the balance is the right to remain silent, but the other side reflects interests that the Court was not willing to concede were of constitutional magnitude, including the asserted right to address the jury on the issue of punishment. 9 5 But, rather than debate the constitutional character of the competing choices, the Court instead disclaimed the constitutional tension theory entirely in favor of a balancing analysis.
There are aspects of the balancing theory which provide an attractive resolution to fifth amendment burden problems. First, such an approach avoids the potentially arbitrary application of an absolute barrier theory. Since the fifth amendment only bars compulsory self-incrimination, the Court would have to stretch the concept of compulsion dramatically to cover lesser burdens on the privi- lege, and no standards readily suggest themselves for this task. Balancing also avoids the rather formalistic Palmigiano analysis in which the automatic character of a penalty is rejected, but where the severe sanctions of a non-mandatory character may then survive challenge.
What balancing does not do, however, is adequately protect fifth amendment rights.9
6 The process appears to permit a superficial assessment of the effect of the penalty on self-incrimination interests. Beyond that, the balance will only be judged after it is determined that such interests are impaired "to an appreciable extent, ' 9 7 a status that may be difficult to reach given the analysis the Court undertook. And finally, apparently no significance is attached to the absence of a state interest behind the penalty.
A PRESUMPTIVE BARRIER THEORY
The Supreme Court's recent fifth amendment decisions have restricted development of the privilege against self-incrimination, and in some respects have actually reversed precedent to cut back upon traditional protections. 8 In light of the narrowed scope into which the right to remain silent has been compressed, and as a result of a compelling need to protect those interests reflected in the privilege against self-incrimination from an increasingly intrusive society, whatever fifth amendment coverage there is demands as much support as society can tolerate.
Absolutely barring any consequence whatsoever upon invocation of the privilege is seemingly the most protective shield for fifth amendment interests. However, the rigidity of such an approach invites skepticism as to its ultimate practicality. Among the options available to undercut the theory are artificial and natural impediments which distinguish the privilege9 and refusals to classify important state sanctions as consequences of remaining silent. oo See note 39 supra.
privilege against self-incrimination.'°' Without a complete catalogue of all such consequences, a decision in favor of an absolute barrier theory may well be unjustified.
The waiver-penalty theory has similar deficiencies. As currently reflected in the Palmigiano and Garrity line of decisions, its protective shield for fifth amendment interests is illusory. As long as the traditional lines of compulsion are not crossed and automatic sanctions are not imposed for invocation of the privilege, very severe pressures on the decision to exercise or forego the privilege will be tolerated.
The balancing theory reflected in Crampton would be more accurately characterized as a weighted balance against the fifth amendment. This is demonstrated by the threshhold level of impairment required by the Court to invoke the balancing process, and the limited analysis of privilege policies it was willing to undertake.1°2 The approach is one readily adaptable for the purposes of circumventing those interests that the privilege against self-incrimination is designed to guard.
Despite the weaknesses of existing theories, it remains possible to devise a sensitive accommodation between the privilege against self-incrimination and the interests encompassed in various kinds of state consequences imposed on those who exercise the right to remain silent. Given the limited range of currently recognized self-incrimination situations, the accommodation should reflect a presumptive barrier weighted against the sanction, and demand a meaningful analysis of underlying state and individual interests. Properly administered, a presumptive barrier theory would insure protection not only against traditional forms of compulsion, which existing theories similarly guard against, but also against less burdensome sanctions which the alternatives do not effectively regulate.
The purpose of the state sanction should be the initial consideration and also be of major significance. As a matter of policy, those penalties which are directed towards coercing testimony rather than fulfilling other goals should not be enforced.1 3 It makes no sense to have a right to remain silent, and yet permit the state to seek purposfully to circumvent it. The fact that we may allow the state for other unrelated but significant reasons to impose a consequence upon assertion of the privilege in no way justifies permitting the state to use its sanction for the purpose of securing testimony.
The preliminary requirement of a purpose unrelated to securing a waiver of the privilege will undoubtedly create difficulties in its application. By hypothesis, all of the state consequences that we are concerned with will in some way burden the decision whether or not to remain silent; absent such an impact, no fifth amendment problems are created. How, then, does one separate those consequences whose impact on that decison is their very purpose from those whose impact is simply a side effect?
The assessment of purpose is not an unfamiliar judicial role. Granting that the line is not and cannot .be precise, the task nevertheless requires a realistic weighing of the factors underlying the sanction. How strongly does the state desire and need the information sought for its purposes? Is the state interest such that it would prefer the information rather than having to impose the sanction? The more these questions are answered in a way that demonstrates a valid non-incriminatory use for the information, the more reason there is to allow the state interest to be entered into the balance. 10 4
The Palmigiano factual circumstances provide an excellent illustration of a suspicious state goal which should not survive a purpose analysis. As can be questioned from that case what function does an adverse inference from silence at a prison disciplinary hearing serve other than either to force the inmate to talk without having to grant him immunity or deter him from defending himself? Allegedly, it would assist the trier of fact in resolving the question of whether a prison infraction occurred," but by the Court's own admission an automatic finding of guilt could not be based on 104 Hit and run statutes exemplify a strong interest in the acquisition of information for non-criminal uses including apportioning civil liability and reaching license revocation decisions. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971 [Vol. 70 the inmate's silence.1 6 Thus, since other evidence of guilt is required, the adverse inference really is not essential for determination of an infraction and the purpose, even if not articulated by the state, must be deemed to be impermissible.' 0 7 Given a presumption in favor of an unimpeded right to remain silent, it is appropriately the state's burden to demonstrate the justification behind its goal. Once the validity of the state's goal is established, the next inquiry must focus upon the availability of alternatives to achieve it. Such a requirement insures that there is no needless interference with the privilege against self-incrimination. In Crampton, for example, the defendant's decision whether to testify on the issue of punishment was burdened by the risk of self-incrimination that he faced on the question of guilt. The simple alternative of a bifurcated trial would remove the burden, and no persuasive reason to maintain the unitary proceeding would exist.1 8 Consequently, the state procedure would not survive constitutional challenge. Finally, assuming a state purpose not directed towards the securing of incriminatory information for criminal purposes and the absence of alternatives to the particular state sanction, an analysis of the individual and state interests would then be undertaken. The Court's efforts at a balancing approach thus far have been woefully deficient in the interest analysis task,"° due undoubtedly to the fact that the balance was weighted against the right to silence. Shifting the burden ofjustification to the state, in contrast, should call for a deeper probe into what social values are promoted by the fifth amendment.
10 Beyond that, the presumption theory would have the further effect of demanding an accounting from the state of what it is seeking to accomplish and why. The full presumptive barrier analysis, when applied to the waiver-penalty cases, would have produced the same result as the Court's rulings, but 106425 U.S. at 317.
" Mr. Justice Brennan complained that "it cannot be denied that the disciplinary penalty was imposed to some extent, if not solely, as a sanction for exercising the constitutional privilege." 425 U.S. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting). for different reasons. First, the "potent sanctions" do not amount to traditional forms of compulsion and thus could not be invalidated for that reason."' The goals of the sanctions do reflect a real state interest in requiring public officials to account for their conduct in office, 112 and therefore, the sanctions do not run afoul of the purpose inquiry. While there are alternatives for acquiring the information, and these alternatives would have to be pursued in a criminal context," 3 the state can support its claim that its interest in insuring responsible public service, given the civil context of the inquiry, need not require that the alternatives be pursued.
That leaves the interest analysis, and it is here that the state cannot meet its burden of overcoming the presumptive barrier to penalizing the fifth amendment. The state's interest in responsible public service and an accounting from officials in the public sector is concededly strong. But, its efforts to secure these goals are undertaken in a civil context which includes, most importantly, a lower standard of proof. It is thus less in need of information directly from the official involved that may also be self-incriminatory.
1 4 Arrayed on the other side of the equation are interests protected by the privilege including forcing the state to make its case without assistance from the accused, and the right to a "private enclave"" -into which the state may not intrude. Privacy of thought and personality and fairness in the balance of power between the state and the individual rest on one side of the scale, while the public accounting goal in its civil context rests on the other. Even if the balance is not conceded to be in favor of the privilege, the fact that the state must overcome a presumption resolves the issue against the state imposed sanction. An illustration of a sanction that would survive the presumptive barrier analysis is provided by the Wisconsin legislation governing motor vehicle license revocations. The relevant statute provides for "1 See notes 50-51 supra. Moreover, not all could be classified as inherently coercive. See note 71 supra "2 Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278 (1968). 13The available alternatives include a grant of use immunity and the utilization of other techniques of investigation such as search and seizure and placement of informants. These, however, are far more burdensome and offer no guarantee of success as compared to the alternatives of unitary or bifurcated trials in Crampton.
"" See, e.g., Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 432 n.6 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
11 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y., 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) .
an automatic one-year revocation of the driver's license of one who fails to "stop and render aid ... in the event of a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death of or personal injury to another or in serious property damage.9
116 The statutory purpose of rendering assistance is an obviously valid one and there are no equivalent alternatives. Moreover, there is no demand for the provision of further incriminatory information and, unlike the hit-andrun statute considered by the Supreme Court," 17 the consequence is a civil license revocation rather than a criminal penalty. In balance, the state's interest in insuring that accident victims receive aid, backed up by a threatened civil sanction, outweighs the individual interest in avoiding the potential incrimination which might arise from complying with the statute.
It may well appear that a presumptive barrier theory will allow the state little room to penalize an individual's exercise of the privilege against selfincrimination. Given the narrowed scope of the fifth amendment, however, that is as it should be. Rather, the theory and its application insures maximum protection for the right to remain silent where the right still exists, while leaving enough room for those special state interests that may outweigh the privilege. Only traditional forms of compulsion would be barred without any attempt at balancing. No further protection for the state is warranted, and hopefully very few such state goals will be deemed to satisfy the standard.
CONCLUSION
The difficulty that the Court has had in developing a standard to govern the imposition of sanctions for the exercise of the privilege against selfincrimination is partly a reflection of its uncertainty as to the proper role the right to silence should have in our system of justice. There is a continuum of pressure tactics that the state can employ to coerce information, and regulating the continuum requires that fundamental policy decisions be made on the relative scope of state power and individual freedom. In undertaking such a task only some of thejudgments, those which reflect the extremes of the continuum, can be made without provoking substantial dissension. The resolution of other conflicts, particularly those in the middle of the range of state coercive tactics, is far more difficult. And, even if the Court has been forced to resolve specific cases of this sort, it has
